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Among South Asian countries, Nepal has liberalized most extensively during the 
1980s and 1990s on both fronts, domestic and external. Nepal is a least developed 
country with a gross national product of US $235 per capita in 2001 and second lowest per 
capita wealth in the world. In South Asia, Nepal has the lowest per capita income, highest 
dependence of population on agriculture and second highest poverty rate. At the same time, 
on an average, Nepal has the lowest tariffs in South Asia and has taken several steps to 
downsize its public distribution system and remove a host of agricultural subsidies. This 
twin scenario where the lowest per capita income country is perhaps also the most 
liberalized makes for an interesting case for policy analysis. This paper reviews the 
outcomes from the liberalization policies followed by Nepal relating to food security. 
The issue at hand is not the beneficial impact of liberalization but the limited extent 
of it and the asymmetric gains across regions in Nepal. Liberalization seems to have retained 
the pre-existing regional disparities and might even have worsened it. The central thesis of 
the paper is that as far as Nepal’s liberalization is concerned, the devil is in the details. At an 
aggregate level, the outcomes from liberalization seem to have worked. Some important 
indicators of well being did improve in the post liberalization period. Aggregate indicators 
of food sufficiency and security (per capita food availability, extent of malnourishment) 
show improvement in Nepal since liberalization. Nepal presents a mixed picture vis-à-vis 
other South Asian countries. It is doing better on some indicators like extent of 
undernourished population while on some other indicators like stunting of children Nepal is v 
actually doing the worst in the region. In particular, since the 1990s the per capita nutrient 
availability has also improved in Nepal.    
The caveats are that many other indicators that are equally relevant for food security 
like agricultural productivity have shown little or no improvement (for example agricultural 
productivity). Most importantly, the fruits of liberalization have been shared as unevenly as 
the prior distribution of economic well being across different regions. Nepal is a landlocked 
country with a uniquely hierarchical geography. The country is divided into three ecological 
regions, the mountains, the hills and the terai. These regions are extremely diverse in terms 
of share in population, arable land, food grain production and the extent of malnourishment 
and under nourishment. They exhibit different degrees of amenability to markets and access 
to food.  
The outcomes from liberalization have also been different across regions and that’s 
where the experience in Nepal stands out. The impact of liberalization on the ex ante 
ordered regions has also been ex post hierarchical with terai reaping the fruits and remote 
regions likely to have been hurt. Different evidences exist that point to this clear 
stratification of winners and losers from liberalization. The computable general equilibrium 
models by Cockburn (2001) and Sapkota (2002) clearly show this ordering with mountains 
being the worse off from liberalization. The evolution of poverty measures and the 
household surveys reveal a similar pattern. The reason for such an uneven outcome is itself 
lack of complementary policies from the government that lead to spatial integration of the 
markets (creation of physical and marketing infrastructure). In other words, having not 
invested in spatial integration, the rationale for government intervention continues in the vi 
form of creation of safety nets and support programs in the remote regions. That the 
government policy is often targeted in the opposite direction with a greater coverage of the 
terai is a different matter.  
  Consequently, even after downsizing and border reforms, the importance of the 
government continues in a real sense. The markets have failed to cater to the remote areas 
and the government has to work as a conduit between the food surplus and deficient 
regions. In the past, there were traditional arrangements that mitigated the food security 
concerns. Increasingly, as the traditional mechanisms have diminished in importance, the 
markets have not assumed the role thereof. The void is there for the government to fill. 
  With the role of the government in distribution and in providing safety nets being 
intact, the question is how has the government fared in this role? Where is the scope for 
improvement? Similarly, how does the marketing and handling efficiency of the 
government compare with that of the private sector? If it does not compare favorably, 
then it calls for realignment with greater role of the private sector (substitution or 
partnership). 
  The evidence suggests that despite several policy changes, reforms including 
some simple ones are desirable. Some policy changes are easy to implement and can still 
yield first order gains. The change in the mode of transport from air to ground is one such 
change. Also, we find that the government is inefficient relative to the private sector. 
There is a clear basis for partnership between private and public sector in sharing 
transportation and storage facilities. Though the policies of government are inefficient on 
various counts, we do not want to underestimate the role of some exogenous factors. In vii 
particular, we recognize the harsh geography and the Maoist turmoil that have made 
several policies ineffective.       
The policy suggestions for Nepal can be clubbed into two categories. The short to 
medium run policy should be directed towards greater involvement of the private sector 
in handling/storage and marketing. The need is to create incentives for greater private 
sector participation. This could take the form of sharing transportation and storage 
facilities. Given the adverse geography of the country, the biggest element of subsidy for 
the government has been on transporting grains. The government has relied excessively 
on air transport for shipping grains. Shifting to ground transportation will not only reduce 
costs but also create employment. This, by itself will contribute to food security. 
Ultimately in the long run, the government has to take steps for the greater spatial 
integration of the markets. It has to create marketing and physical infrastructure. 
Proposals for creating a pulley link between different regions have been in the discussion 
but have not been implemented. The contrast of Nepal with the experience of Bangladesh 
is quite stark here. Bangladesh invested in the integration of markets through roadways 
and to an extent through waterways. As a result, the benefits of liberalization there have 
been much more even than in Nepal. 
In the policies discussed above, the current insurgency and political uncertainty 
stands as a roadblock. Not only has it affected the atmosphere for private enterprise 
adversely, implementation of government programs and feasibility of certain policies 
themselves have been put to question (like transporting grains using ground). At the same 
time, the extremely scarce government resources have been diverted to military purposes.   1 
TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND FOOD SECURITY IN NEPAL 
Bishwambher Pyakuryal, Y B Thapa and Devesh Roy 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Among South Asian countries, Nepal liberalized most extensively during the 
1980s and with continuity in the 1990s on both fronts, domestic and external. Nepal is a 
least developed country with a gross national product of US $235 per capita in 2001 and 
second lowest per capita wealth in the world. In the South Asia region, Nepal has the lowest 
per capita income, highest dependence of population on agriculture and second highest 
poverty rate. At the same time, on an average, Nepal has the lowest tariffs in South Asia and 
has taken several steps to downsize its public distribution system and remove a host of 
agricultural subsidies. This twin scenario where the lowest per capita income country is 
perhaps also the most liberalized makes for an interesting case for policy analysis. This 
paper reviews the outcomes from the liberalization policies followed by Nepal relating to 
food security. 
The issue at hand is not the beneficial impact of liberalization but the limited extent 
of it and the asymmetric gains across regions in Nepal. Liberalization seems to have retained 
the pre-existing regional disparities and might even have worsened it. The central thesis of 
this paper is that as far as Nepal’s liberalization is concerned, the devil is in the details. At an 
aggregate level, the outcomes from liberalization seem to have worked to some extent. 
Several aggregate level indicators of food sufficiency and security (per capita food 
availability, extent of malnourishment) show improvement in Nepal since liberalization. The 2 
caveats are that many other indicators that are equally relevant for food security like 
agricultural productivity have shown little or no improvement. Most importantly, as stated 
above, the fruits of liberalization have been shared as unevenly as the prior distribution of 
economic well being across population in different regions. Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 and figures 
1, 2 and 3 present a comparative picture of South Asia. Nepal presents a mixed picture vis-à-
vis other South Asian countries. It is doing better on some indicators like extent of 
undernourished population while on some other indicators like stunting of children Nepal is 
actually doing the worst in the region.
1 In particular, since the 1990s the per capita nutrient 
availability has improved in Nepal  
                                                      
1 Indicators like stunting and wasting depend also on the health delivery systems which are below the South 
Asian average in case of Nepal.  3 
Table 1—Profile of South Asia, year 2002 
 
Indicator Unit  Bangladesh  India  Nepal  Pakistan  Sri  Lanka 
GDP  constant 1995 US$ 
millions 
53758.7 517263.2  5806.3  75118.6  17048.8 
 growth  rate  (%)
b   5.1 5.4  3.6  3.2  3.5 
GDP per capita  constant 1995 US$  396.2  493.3  240.7  518.4  898.8 
 growth  rate  (%)
b   3.3 3.6  1.2  0.7  2.1 
Agricultural GDP  % of total GDP  22.7  22.7  40.8  23.2  20.1 
 growth  rate  (%)




% of total 
employment 
62.1 66.7  78.5  48.4  41.6 
Trade %  of  GDP  33.3  30.8  44.9  37.7  79.0 
Trade in goods  % of GDP  29.4  20.8  35.8  35.8  65.2 
Poverty gap
d   at $1 a day (%)  8.1  8.2  9.7  2.4  1.0 




% of total 
population 
49.8 28.6  42.0  32.6  25.0 
 %  of  rural 
population 
53.0 30.2  44.0  35.9  27.0 
 %  of  urban 
population 
36.6 24.7  23.0  24.2  15.0 
GINI  index  31.8  32.5  36.7  33.0  34.4 
Under-nourished 
population 




% in 1996-2002  48.0  47.0  48.0  38.0  33.0 
Stunting children under 
age five
g  
% in 1996-2002  45.0  45.0  51.0  36.0  20.0 
Low birth weight  % of births in 1998-
2000 
30.0 30.0  21.0  19.0  22.0 
Infant mortality rate  per 1000 live births  48.0  65.0  62.0  76.0  16.0 
Under five mortality rate  per 1000 live births  73.0  90.0  83.0  101.0  19.0 
Source:  World Development Indicators CD-ROM, World Bank, 2004.  
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Table 2—Food production index, 1989-91 = 100  
 
Year Bangladesh India  Nepal  Pakistan  Sri  Lanka 
1971-75  67.66 56.84 57.78 52.60 72.54 
1976-80  77.50 65.68 62.34 61.90 87.16 
1981-85  83.50 78.24 74.14 73.70 103.32 
1986-90  92.98 92.38 91.06 91.68 100.70 
1991-95  102.48 108.44 104.20 113.64 107.86 
1996-00  121.26 126.02 123.14 145.86 111.66 
2001  135.80 133.60 136.40 151.00 116.10 
2002  140.10 129.80 138.50 153.20 115.70 
Source:  World Development Indicators CD-ROM, World Bank, 2004.  
Notes: Average values for the five year periods are reported except for 2001 and 2002, which are annual  
           data. 
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Table 3—Production, availability and consumption of cereals in South Asia (’000 tonnes)  
 
Year Production  Imports  Stock 
change  Exports  Availability
b  Consumption 
Net imports 
as % of 
availability 
Per capita per annum (kgs) 
    
a         Availability Consumption 
Bangladesh                
1971-75 11380  2036  -924  0  12492  11512 16.3 174.6 160.9 
1976-80 13371  1398  -381  0  14388  13300 9.7  177.6 164.2 
1981-85 15668  1854  -688  4  16829  15597 11.0 183.1 169.7 
1986-90 17532  2018  177  0  19726  18306 10.2 189.2 175.6 
1991-95 18948  1472  1354  0  21774  20025 6.8  185.1 170.2 
1996-00 22833  2660  -331  0  25161  23096 10.6 190.2 174.6 
2001 25936  2908  -1025  2  27818  25493  10.4  197.5  181.0 
2002 26924  2826  -460  1  29289  26912  9.6  203.7  187.1 
India                
1971-75 93739  3960  -1116  160  96423  85293 3.9  162.4 143.6 
1976-80 109517  1850  -2166  526  108674  95871  1.2  164.3 144.9 
1981-85 127882  1560  -3285  529  125628  111248 0.8  171.3 151.7 
1986-90 146066  823  401  507  146784  130849 0.2  180.4 160.9 
1991-95 166434  431  388  2067  165186  144765 -1.0  184.1 161.4 
1996-00 186096  1166  -6607  3350  177305  154244 -1.2  180.5 157.0 
2001 196267  43  -8056  5379  182875  157980  -2.9  177.0  152.9 
2002 174655  54  23826  9485  189051  165662  -5.0  180.1  157.8 6 
Table 3—Production, availability and consumption of cereals in South Asia (’000 tonnes) (Contd.)  
Year Production  Imports  Stock 
change  Exports Availability
b  Consumption 
Net imports 
as % of 
availability 
Per capita per annum (kgs) 
    
a         Availability Consumption 
Nepal    
           
1971-75  2809  4  -156
  166  2491  2029  -6.5 193.7  157.8 
1976-80  2812  14  -66
  60  2700  2272  -1.7 189.2  159.3 
1981-85 3186  50  -20  45  3171  2701  0.1 199.4 169.9 
1986-90 4083  41  -3  10  4111  3422  0.7 230.6 192.0 
1991-95 4478  45  -5  2  4516  3805  0.9 226.1 190.6 
1996-00 5361  89  -135  23  5292  4198  1.3 235.5 186.7 
2001 5733  55  11  12  5787  4662  0.7  240.5  193.8 
2002 5839  38  57  10  5924  4773  0.5  240.7  193.9 
2002 24936  287  3818  2965  26076  23099  -10.3  173.9  154.1 
Sri Lanka                 
1971-75  945 938  112  2  1992  1898  47.0 152.9  145.7 
1976-80 1226  1078  -75  6  2223  2106  48.2  157.5 149.2 
1981-85 1635  731  -7  1  2360  2205  31.0  155.4 145.3 
1986-90 1618  884  72  0  2575  2384  34.3  157.5 145.9 
1991-95 1745  1025  -37  16  2718  2509  37.1  155.9 143.9 
1996-00 1731  1206  -28  3  2907  2622  41.4  159.0 143.4 
2001 1831  952  249  5  3026  2722  31.3  161.4  145.2 
2002 1938  1306  -252  10  2982  2745  43.5  157.7  145.2 
Source  : FAOSTAT, FAO web site, accessed January 2005.  
Note  : Average values for the five year periods are reported except for 2001 and 2002, which are annual   
  data. 
  a – Positive (negative) values indicates stock depletion (addition to stocks).  
    b – Availability = Production + Imports + Stock change - Exports.  7 
Table 4—Food price index, 1995 = 100  
 
Year Bangladesh  India Nepal  Pakistan  Sri  Lanka 
1981-85  50.29 31.19 29.33 36.43
a  28.87 
1986-90  79.46 47.59 49.79 47.96 46.56 
1991-95  94.92 81.33 85.92 79.16 85.15 
1996-00  114.03 121.31 128.64 126.90 141.93 
2001  128.28 135.10 142.63 141.35 183.49 
2002  131.61 138.62 n.a.  147.06 203.05 
 
Source: World Development Indicators CD-ROM, World Bank, 2004.  
Notes: Average values for the five year periods are reported except for 2001 and 2002, which are annual  
           data. Data for the 1970s are not available, and hence are not reported. This is an average over  
           1982-85.  
 
 




















































Source: FAO Stat (2004). 9 
Nepal is a landlocked country with a uniquely hierarchical geography. The 
geographical and economic features of Nepal present unique challenges for its socio-
economic development and make a large section of the population vulnerable to food 
insecurity. It has a high population density (158 persons per square kilometer in 2001), 
immense physical diversity and is land-locked. 86% of the population lives in the rural 
areas. The country is divided into three ecological regions, the mountains, the hills and the 
terai. These three regions are extremely diverse in terms of share in population, arable land, 
food grain production and the extent of malnourishment and under nourishment (Figure 4). 
They also exhibit different degrees of amenability to markets and access to food. The 
resulting outcomes from liberalization have also been diverse across regions. In this sense, 
the experience of liberalization in Nepal stands out. The impact of liberalization on the ex 
ante segregated regions has also been ex post hierarchical with terai reaping the fruits and 
remote regions likely to have been hurt. 
Different evidence exist that point to this clear stratification of winners and losers 
from liberalization in Nepal. The computable general equilibrium models by Cockburn 
(2001) and Sapkota (2001) clearly show this ordering with mountains being the worse off 
from liberalization. The evolution of poverty measures and the household surveys reveal a 
similar pattern. The role of the government in Nepal can best be understood in this context. 
Liberalization in Nepal is likely to have affected regions quite asymmetrically. The reason 
for such an uneven outcome is itself lack of complementary policies from the government 
that lead to spatial integration of the markets (creation of physical and marketing 
infrastructure). In other words, having not invested in spatial integration, the government 10 
continues to have a strong rationale for the creation of safety nets and support programs in 
the remote regions. That the government policy is often targeted in the opposite direction 
with a greater coverage of the terai is a different matter.  
Figure 4—Hierarchical geography in Nepal 












































  The border trade reforms by themselves are likely to have a limited impact in 
Nepal. There are at least two reasons for this policy ineffectiveness. First, by sharing an 
extensive porous border with India, Nepal has always been a de facto free trading nation. 
The trade barriers in that sense have been non-binding. Thus, the dilution of trade barriers 
is likely to have only a limited impact. Secondly, due to a lack of spatial integration, the 
gains from liberalization are being shared unevenly across the population in Nepal. The 
situation is such that parts of terai are much better integrated with India than with rest of 
the country itself.  11 
  Consequently, even though the government has downsized itself and attempted 
several border reforms, the importance of the government has not diminished in a real 
sense. The markets have failed to reach the remote areas and the role of the government 
as a conduit between the food surplus and the food deficient region has remained intact 
pre and post liberalization. In the past, there were traditional arrangements that mitigated 
the food security concerns. Increasingly, as the traditional mechanisms diminished in 
importance, the markets did not assume the role thereof.  
Historically, the village communities used intra or inter-community trade as a 
tool to smoothen food availability across groups. Most villages in the western region had 
“religious storehouses” (Dharma Bhakari) in which every household contributed food 
according to their capacity. This food was distributed to people facing food crisis. The 
initiative was part of a larger concept of community ownership and participation. In 
Jumla, for example, cooperative societies have been managing irrigation facilities over 
the last 500 years. Similarly, the Sherpas have 'Newa' systems of forest and pasture 
management, and Gurungs have the 'Riti-Thiti' system to protect common resources. The 
traditional institutions helped both in direct targeting of 'food security' and also in a 
reduction in the vulnerability of the households. 
The role of trade and exchange was also important in ensuring availability of food 
not produced locally. The exchanges took place between ecological regions producing 
different commodities. For example, the Himalayan people sold herbs, spices and salt to 
the hill people, and the hill people in return sold food grains. The inter-regional trade has 
declined since the 1960s. People from food insecure region such as Karnali would move 12 
south (to the hills) during winter to escape cold. They would sell salt and other produce 
of their region, using the animals for transportation. After spending the winter, they 
would move back with food grains.  
Various economic, political and institutional developments are responsible for the 
decline in traditional arrangements. The community forestry system was one of the 
reasons for the break-up. It restricted open grazing and initiated charging of fees for 
grazing. In recent times the insurgents have further interrupted the interregional 
movements. An endogenous system of adjustment is thus sorely missed in recent times. 
In Nepal, the domestic policy at least in the short to medium run (construction of roads or 
transport infrastructure takes time) has to be focused on distribution in a major way. 
With the role of the government in distribution and in providing safety nets 
remaining intact, the question that arises is how has the government fared in this role? 
The issues at hand are as follows. Since the transportation of grains has been exclusively 
in the hands of the government, has the transportation policy being efficient? Where is 
the scope for improvement? Similarly, the government being the much bigger agency in 
distribution: how does the marketing and handling efficiency of the government compare 
with that of the private sector? The evidence from different studies suggests many policy 
changes. Yet, reforms including some simple ones are desirable. For example, the change 
in the mode of transport from air to ground shipment can reap large gains. The paper also 
finds government comparatively inefficient relative to the private sector. In drawing 
implications of this inefficiency we do want to recognize the role of some exogenous 13 
factors. In particular, we do recognize the extremely harsh geography and the recent 
Maoist turmoil that have made several policies ineffective.  
2. BACKGROUND   
Agriculture contributed to 38% of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 66% of 
employment (75%, if agriculture related trade and manufacturing are covered). During 
1991-2001, the agricultural growth (2.66%/year) was marginally higher than the population 
growth rate. 
During 1976-96, the average economic growth rate was 4%, the per capita growth 
rate per annum was merely 1.6%. The GDP grew by only 0.8% in 2001. This decline is 
partly attributable to the ensuing political unrest. Agricultural growth rate of less than 
2.5% has been disappointing. It has also been volatile due to monsoon dependence. In the 
1990s, the growth was negative in 3 out of 8 years, was more volatile and less than the 
population growth rate. Poverty and food insecurity has been checked to some extent 
only by the remittances. In 2002, Rs. 100 billion was received as remittances in Nepal.  
As discussed, one of the pertinent characteristics for understanding the food 
security concerns and the policies there of is the ecological setting in Nepal. The remote 
areas tend to be less food secure due to higher prices of food, weaker political power, and 
in recent times due to the Maoist turmoil.   
The terai region has a high population density and is a major producer of food 
grains, partly due to better market facilities and infrastructure. The hill has moderate 
density with lower grain production and market access. The mountain has the lowest 14 
population density, food production and the worst access to markets. Both the hill and the 
mountain regions have difficult terrains and climatic conditions that make the delivery of 
public services and food a big challenge. The policy implication of this hierarchical 
geography is two fold: (i) Distribution policies are extremely important and (ii) there is 
strong role of facilitation for markets (through the creation of infrastructure) to integrate 
spatially.  
2.1  ECONOMIC AND AGRICULTURAL BACKWARDNESS IN NEPAL 
Absolute poverty in Nepal increased from 36 to 42% during 1977-96. The poverty 
incidence does not vary significantly between the hills and terai but is extremely high in 
the mountain zone (Figure 4). The Eastern and Central Development Regions are less 
poor than those in other development regions (NPC 1998). Poverty is more severe in 
rural areas of Western, Mid-western and Far-western Development Regions (UNDP 
2002). In line with the spatial distribution of poverty, the most food insecure region in the 
country is the Far-Western Region. Poverty is also more visible among the occupational 
castes and ethnic people like the Limbu, Tamang, Magar, Tharu, Musahar, and other 
indigenous groups (NESAC, 1998). NLSS 1995/96 estimated that 40% of population (or 
9.2 million) was under absolute poverty based on intake of 2,124 calories and 
expenditure required to procure a minimum level of non-food goods and services (CBS 
1996a and b). 
If wage rates catch up with food prices then purchasing power for food is 
maintained. The lag in wages behind food prices in Nepal due to the labor market 15 
imperfections is a very important cause of poverty and food insecurity. A large 
proportion of laborers are employed in the unorganized sector. There is no formal 
recording of wage rates (GFONT 1999). Government has recently fixed minimum wage 
rates in farming at Rs 60 per day (8 hours) (which is below US $1). On an average, only 
8.5% laborers are employed in the formal sector. The possibilities of wage rationalization 
are limited. Minimum wage rates in industries and services have generally been below 
the inflation rates, although it is reviewed every two years. 
In an agrarian economy, land ownership is the most important source of food 
security, land being the most important asset. Greater landholdings also provide a greater 
marketable surplus. Land ownership in Nepal is extremely skewed. According to the 
National Sample Census of Agriculture (NSCA) 1992, the average farm size was only 0.9 
hectare per holding (Table 5). Marginal farmers comprise 43% of farm households and 
operate only 11% of the area (Table 6). The investment in land improvement is less than 
3% of household income (NRB 1994). With such sizes, there is little prospect for rise in 
farm productivity. The current growth in agricultural productivity is merely 0.4%.  
  16 
Table 5—Average Farm size by Regions (Hectare/holding)  (1992) 
 
Particulars Unit  Terai  Hill  Mountain  Nepal 
Area under cultivation  %  38  14  3  16 
Farm size  Ha/holding  1.23  0.77  0.68  0.95 
Owner-tiller tenure  %  87.1  95.4  94.2  90.9 
Gini index with households  Ratio  0.55  0.47  0.43  0.52 
Gini index with population  Ratio  0.46  0.40  0.39  0.44 
   Source: CBS/ NSCA 1994. 
 
Table 6—Distribution of Farm Holdings and Operational Land by Farm Sizes  
                 (1992) 
 
Particulars  Marginal (< 0.5 ha)  Small (0.5 – 2.0 ha)  Large (>2.0 ha) 
Farm households (in %)  43.1  45.9`  11.0 
Operational land area (in %)  11.3  46.8  41.9 
Source: Compiled from Table 2.6 of CBS (1994). 
2.2  HISTORY OF FOOD AVAILABILITY IN NEPAL 
At a national level, Nepal was food secure till the early 1970s except in periods of 
unfavorable weather as in 1972. Food balance for 1970/71 showed a surplus of 294 
thousand MT. Estimates for 1974/75 revealed even greater surplus (539 thousands MT).
2 
Food was exported from terai even though the hills remained food deficient. In 1977, the 
government estimated the deficit at 1.5%. Alternative estimates from Gurung (1989) are 
however much higher, at 15-19% in 1976 and 18-22% in 1977. During the drought of 
1980, Nepal received food aid from friendly countries to meet the shortages.  
Nepal, over the last few years has experienced sporadic food insufficiency at the 
national level. However, the food security concerns are most pronounced at the 
household level. Recent estimates of the average per capita food deficit are 47 kg in the 
                                                      
2 Food and Agricultural Marketing Services Department (1982), Food Statistics of Nepal 1981, Page 14. 17 
mountains and 32 kg in the hills even though the per capita surplus is 45 kg at the 
national level.  
The food deficits to requirements ratio has fluctuated heavily depending on the 
weather. From a deficit of 12.5% during 1990-94, the net food balance moved to 1.9% in 
2001. In terms of the district-wise breakdown, in 2001, 36 of the 75 districts were unable 
to produce sufficient food (Table 7 and 8). The per capita gross food grain production 
decreased from 376 to 277 kg during 1974-1992 (APROSC and JMA 1995), i.e. a decline 
of 1.85% per annum. The gross production of 277 kg per capita translates to 190 kg in 
edible form just slightly more than the official minimum per capita requirements of 180 
kg (Wallace 1987:3, Uma 1993: 44). Tables 8 and 9 show the belt-wise food availability 
and requirement of cereals in 2000/2001 and the data on Nepal’s food production and 
requirements.  
The shortfall in domestic production is due to declining productivity of land in 
the hills and mountains. It is noticeable that this decline occurred in spite of an increase 
in the use of fertilizers and pesticides. Lack of irrigation facilities and investment in 
infrastructure such as roads are accountable for this decline in agricultural production.  
 
Table 7—Number of Districts deficit in food production, 2000/2001  
 
Development Region  Total  Ecological belts 
Eastern Central Western Midwestern Far  western   
Mountain  1 (3)  2 (3)  2 (2)  5 (5)  3 (3)  13 (16) 
Hills  1 (8)  7 (9)  5 (11)  4 (7)  4 (4)  21 (39) 
Terai  0 (5)  2 (7)  0 (3)  0 (3)  0 (2)  2 (20) 
Total  2 (16)  11 (19)  7 (16)  9 (15)  7 (9)  36 (75) 
          Note: Figures in parenthesis are total districts in each block.  
          Source: Department of Agriculture (2002).  18 











Food Balance  
(Thousands mt) 
Mountain 1,715  248  328  -  80 
Hills 10,335  1,742 2,077  -  336 
Terai 11,189  2,524 2,025  499 
Nepal 23,239  4,513  4,430  83 
 
Table 9—Nepal's Food Production and Requirements (Edible Food grains in      
1000 MT) 
Crops  1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 
Rice  1,892 1738  1,394 1,827 1,578 1,950 2,003 2036  2,074 2,259 2,357 
Maize 877 837 1,100  838 883 930 895 941 920 1,007  1,001 
Wheat 652 604 596 687 709 787 827 809 856 935 915 
Millet 190 188 194 225 219 236 237 234 239 242 232 
Barley  8 8 8 8 8 11  11  10  9 8 8 
Total 
production 
3,61,9  3,373 3,292 3,585 3,398 3,919 3,973 4,027 4,098 4,452 4,513 
Total 
required 
3,487 3,562 3,634 3,724 3,883 3,948 40,79 4,178 4,279 4,383 4,430 
Balance  132  -188 -342 -139 -485 -34  -107 -151 -182 68  83 
%  -  -5.3 -9.4 -3.7 -12.5  -0.9 -2.6 -3.6 -4.2 +  1.6  +  1.9 
Source: Dept. of Agriculture/MDD (2000). P. 102; CBS (2002), MoAC (2002) Statistical Pocket Book,   
             P.88.T: total. 
  
The major grains are paddy, maize, wheat, millet and barley. During 1970-90, the 
share of wheat in total production has increased, paddy is nearly constant, and maize and 
coarse cereals has decreased (table 10). The share of terai in grain production increased 
from 51 to 58% while that of hill and mountains decreased. The food production per 
capita in the terai is nearly 50% higher than in hills and two times higher than in 
mountain regions. This implies that the food policy has to be geared in developing 
efficient means of distribution and not only production.  19 
Table 10—Trends in the share of food grain production and availability 
 
Particulars  1970s 1980s 1990s Average 
Share by crops (%)         
Paddy  58.9 58.7 57.0 58.0 
Maize  25.4 22.2 22.2 22.6 
Wheat  10.5 14.7 15.8 14.6 
Millet & Barley  5.2  4.4  5.0  4.8 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Share by regions (%)         
Terai  51.4 57.2 57.7 56.5 
Hill    43.4 38.1 37.7 38.7 
Mountain  5.2 4.7 4.6 4.8 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Kg per capita by regions         
Terai  439 381 363 394 
Hill  300 246 251 266 
Mountain  193 170 184 182 
Nepal  346 301 298 315 
Source: NPC and CBS Annual Publications. 
 
The export of agricultural products was a major source of foreign exchange until 
1979. During 1974-79, food grain comprised 25% of the total merchandise exports (Table 
11.1). Since the 1990s, the foreign exchange from other sources is being used to import 
food. The deficit in food trade has increased from about 1 to 4 billion Rs on three year 
average basis during 1991-2001. Nepal resumed exporting small amounts of rice and 
wheat in 2000. Nepal’s spending on food imports increased sharply between 1993 and 
1999 from Rs. 622 to Rs 1,641 million. The trade balance is positive for a few years only 
if pulses are included (Tables 11.2 and 11.3).
3 
                                                      
3Agricultural Marketing Information Bulletin, 2002: Table 12A-12D. 20 
Table 11.1—Export of Food grains from Nepal (Rs. in Million) 
To India  Food grains export/total export (%)  Fiscal year 
Rice Maize  Total India Overseas Total 
1974/ 75  116.7  0  116.7  15.63  2.6  13.5 
1975/ 76  495.4    495.4  55.43  0.0  41.7 
1976/ 77  343  1.4  344.4  44.18  0.0  29.5 
1977/ 78  46.5  4.7  51.2  10.28  25.2  18.1 
1978/ 79  13.3  4.9  18.2  2.80  37.7  20.2 
1979/ 80  2.9  2.7  5.6  1.08  6.2  3.9 
1980/ 81  117.6  24.5  142.1  14.32  0.0  8.8 
1981/ 82  136.5  26.1  162.6  16.35  17.3  16.6 
1982/ 83  11.3  0.3  11.6  1.38  0.0  1.0 
1983/ 84  75.7  0.4  76.1  6.56  0.0  4.4 
1984/ 85  250  10.9  260.9  16.29  0.0  9.5 
1985/ 86  93.2    93.2  1.16  0.0  0.4 
1986/ 87  14.4    14.4  0.08  0.0  0.03 
1987/ 88  0    0  0.01  0.0  0.0 
1988/ 89  0  1.3  1.3  0.13  0.0  0.03 
1989/ 90    0.1  0.1  0.02  0.0  0.0 
1990/ 91    5.8  5.8  0.37  0.0  0.08 
1991/ 92      0  0.00  0.0  0.0 
1992/ 93      0  0.00  0.0  0.0 
1993/ 94      0  0.00  0.0  0.0 
1994/ 95      0  0.00  0.0  0.0 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, 1996/97. 
 
The most important reason for the decline in competitiveness is the stagnation in 
agricultural productivity. Yields for most crops, except wheat, were stagnant or increased 
only marginally during 1985-99 (NPC 2001). Productivity increase was only 1.5% for 
paddy, 0.2% for maize and 1.9% for wheat. Sharma (2002) compares the yield trends of 
in Nepal to rest of South Asia. From the 1960s till date, the average yield in Nepal has 
fallen from 157 to 61% of the South Asian average. The crop yield in Nepal grew by 
about 1.25% per annum while growth rates in India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
were 5.28, 1.92, 5.5 and 2.7%, respectively.  21 
  Various factors have accounted for this stagnation in productivity: small and 
fragmented land holdings, lack of irrigation facilities, accessibility for marketing and 
purchase of inputs, appropriate technology and land degradation. The small land holding 
per se would not be so counter-productive if there were good economic incentives, 
technology and required infrastructure. In Vietnam, for example, the average land 
holding of a family is about 0.25 ha. Households in Vietnam are generally food secure 
and Vietnam is a big exporter of rice to the extent of 12-13% of the world's exports. The 
land owned by poor is also more prone to degradation due to excessive farming. The 
environmental degradation has also caused a decline in productivity. Only recently has 
the forest degradation has been slowed down through community forestry.  
 
Table 11.2—Growth of Food Trade, 1974/ 75 – 99/ 2000 (in 1984/ 85 Prices) 
Food groups  Growth rate %/ annum 
Export of food and live animals  -0.60 
Export of animal and vegetable oil and fat  16.03 
Total food exports  7.92 
Import of food and live animals  5.91 
Import of animal and vegetable oil and fat  18.57 
Total food imports  9.14 
Export less import growth rates  -1.22 
Source: NRB (October 2000) Quarterly Economic Bulletins. 
 
Table 11.3—Trade Balance of Food Grains (1993-1998) (Rs million) 
Trade  Commodities  1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 
Rice  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 8.0 74.1 
Maize  0.0 0.0 0.0 5.8 4.4 0.1 
Pulses  347.3 456.9 663.4 1,039 1,057.1  1,191.2 
Exports (x) 
Total  347.3 456.9 663.4 1,044.9  1,069.5  1,256.4 
Without  pulses  -622.0 -491.3 -821.5 -377.4 -158.4 -1,641.0  Balance (x-m) 
With  pulses  -274.7 -169.1 -277.1 511.8  717.1  -595.6 
Source: Sharma, 2002. 
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3. STRUCTURAL  ADJUSTMENT:  BREAK IN NEPAL’S POLICY 
LANDSCAPE 
 
Box 1 lists the milestones in the food policy in Nepal. In summary, the period 
until the 1980s followed a continuity in terms of limited role of the private sector and 
varying degrees of government intervention. In the mid 1980s, the policy moved towards 
a greater use of price mechanisms in the agricultural sector. The budget allocated to 
agriculture increased marginally till the mid-1980s, and has since declined in relative 
terms (Table 12). The agricultural plans have begun to lay higher emphasis on cash crops. 
In the 7th plan, for example, the strategy was to encourage commercial agriculture. It 
began by selling off government farms. The 8th Plan target was to increase production of 
cereals by 5.4% and of cash crops by 9.1% per year.  
The thrust for reforms in 1980s came from structural adjustment programs. Nepal 
faced severe problems of balance of payment (BoP) and budget deficits in the mid-1980s 
due to rising government expenditures aimed at offsetting the sluggish economic growth 
rates during 1975-80. The deficit was financed primarily through an increase in money 
supply, which fuelled inflation, led to an import surge and consequently large current 
account deficits. The decline in export earnings and foreign aid inflows led to a crisis-like 
situation in the early 1980s.  
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•  During the Rana rule (1846-1950 AD), the state catered to the food needs of the military and civil servants. Food grain 
was obtained from Guthi and Raikar lands and for effective distribution, 'food stores' were kept under the control of the 
Commander-in-Chief  
•  In 1948, the government established a 'Rice Milling and Sales Company' under military control.  
•  The 1949, the establishment of the Department of Rice Mills and Sales marked the beginning of public sector 
intervention in distribution of subsidized food grain in Kathmandu Valley.  
•  With the multi-party system in early 1950, food administration was separated from the military. 
•  In 1951, a "Department of Food" was created in the Center with Regional Food Control Offices to procure rice in the 
Terai and dispatch it to Kathmandu for distribution. By 1951-52, there were 32 stores under this food control office. 
•  In 1955, the government converted Regional Food Control Office to 'Food Storage and Sales Department' with a 
purpose to supply rice to Kathmandu cities (about 2,000 MT every year). In 1957, these units were merged to create a 
new "Food Office".  
•  In the early 1960s, the government instituted a 'Valley Food Arrangement Committee' and allocated budget from 
government sources. 
•  In 1964, the government replaced the Committee by 'Food Arrangement Corporation' to distribute food obtained 
locally. 
•  In 1965, "Food Management Corporation" was established under the Corporation Act to replace Food Arrangement 
Corporation. This institution continued till 1972. 
•  In 1971/72, the droughts and excess rains in hilly and remote regions of the country underscored the need for a national 
level agency. Thus, HMG created the Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) by merging the Food Management 
Corporation and the "Agricultural Supply Corporation. The objectives were to: (i) Provide regular and organized 
supply of agricultural inputs, (ii) Make food grains available at a reasonable price for the poor in food deficit districts, 
(iii) Achieve better co-ordination by bringing both the input and output distribution functions under single 
management, (iv) Promote food grain exports to countries other than India, (vi) Stabilize prices of food grains, and (vii) 
Increase agricultural production by providing incentives to the producers. 
•  In 1973, the government integrated the Agricultural Supply Corporation and the Food Arrangement Corporation (FAC) 
into the Agriculture Purchase and Sales Corporation. The FAC took care of food supply all over the country.  
•  In 1974, the agriculture Purchase and Sales Corporation was split into the AIC and NFC under the Corporation Act. 
NFC was responsible for handling food grain distribution while the AIC was responsible for providing inputs to 
farmers. The NFC was entrusted with procurement, storage and distribution of food grains as follows: (i) Procure, 
store, transport and distribute food grains at a fair price in order to meet the food requirements in the remote and food 
deficit areas and to maintain farm incomes. (ii) Ensure adequate supply of food-grains and other essential commodities, 
(iii) Implement the rice exports program of the  government, (vi) Maintain a reserve stock in relation to domestic 
requirements, and (vii) Construct and maintain warehouses for storage and distribution. NFC was established to 
distribute food in deficit areas (i.e. mainly hilly and mountain districts) but a major part of the food has mostly been 
sold in the Kathmandu valley. 
•  In 1986, the NPC identified one of the tasks to monitor the price movements across the border with India. The 
Minimum Support Price (MSP) and other prices fixed by the Government of India was one of the factors considered in 
deciding the level of MSP and the sales price of fertilizers.  
•  Since 1998/99, the policies have been to downsize the NFC, and increase the role of private sector in food marketing. 
Since mid-1990s, NFC has reduced its operations.  
 24 






Note: The share of agriculture in development outlay was 1
st plan 27%, 2
nd plan 15%, 3
rd plan 21.7%, 4
th  
          plan 33.1 % and 5
th plan 34.8%. .Source: HMG 1962; NPC 1965; NPC 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985,  
         1992. 
 
  Nepal underwent the IMF-supported "Stabilization Program" since December 
1985, and further initiated the "Structural Adjustment Program" with the support of 
Structural Adjustment Loans (SAL-I in 1987 and SAL-II in 1989), and a Structural 
Adjustment Facility in 1988. As part of a broader liberalization, the agricultural policies 
also adopted reforms such as removal of subsidies, privatization of the Agriculture Inputs 
Corporation (AIC), deregulation and opening up to foreign direct investment. 
Concurrently, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) helped develop and implement the 
Agricultural Perspective Plan (APP). The plan had the following objectives: 
Raising the growth rate of agricultural sector from around 3 to 5% annually 
during 1995-2016 and reducing the share of population living below the poverty line 
from 42 to 15%. The main strategy conceived in the APP was to increase the usage of 
modern agricultural inputs to enhance productivity. After the change in the government 
in 1990, the policymakers vigorously pursued several liberalization policies, namely 
deregulation of interest rates, liberalization in international trade, removal of a number of 
restrictions on foreign investments, opening of the financial sector to foreign and private 
sector investment and privatization of public sector enterprises, exchange rate adjustment, 
Plan periods  Outlay on Agr. (%)  Agr. GDP growth targets (%/year) 
Sixth plan (1980-85)  31.3  Agdp 3.0; 
Seventh plan (1985-90)  24.5  Agdp 4.3; food grains 4.1; cash crops 5.2 
Eighth plan (1992-97)  25.8  Agdp 4.8, food grains 5.4; cash crops 9.1 
Ninth plan (1998-2003)  27.1  Agdp 4.0, food grains 5.2; cash crops 6.5 
Tenth plan (2003-2007)  24.0  Agdp 4.1, food grains 3.7; cash crops 4.4 25 
restraining domestic borrowing, lowering of excise duties and sales tax, and an increase 
in direct tax. 
4.  ELEMENTS OF LIBERALIZATION: INTEGRATION OF DOMESTIC 
MARKET WITH EXTERNAL MARKETS 
Nepal underwent substantial trade liberalization through the elimination of 
quantitative restrictions, and reduction and rationalization of tariffs since the 1980s. In 
2002, the agricultural tariffs were the lowest in South Asia. Tariffs on live animals and 
animal products and vegetable products were 5 and 15% respectively. Animal or 
vegetable fats and oils and prepared foodstuffs faced a rate of 10 and 25%. There is no 
tariff on staples and there are no quantitative restrictions on imports of agricultural 
products. Nepal's applied tariff on agricultural imports is 14.5% (Box 2 and Table 13). 
Nepal's bound tariffs are about 50% lower than that of India.  
HMG/N has envisaged a two-pronged strategy to integrate the domestic food 
market with external markets. First, it includes an effort to strengthen the manufacturing 
processes of food items. Second, it requires increasing the private sector's role as 
intermediaries for effective delivery of services. It presumes the role of the government 
as a facilitator. 
The APP envisaged that the hill region would reach food self-sufficiency and 
even supply a modest amount to the mountains by the end of 10
th plan and terai would 
generate exports. This is far from being realized. Different plans have aimed at 
encouraging competition among private sectors to increase supply of inputs, expand local 
markets, and supply of essential commodities. The 9
th plan supported market 26 
development in hilly areas through (a) the creation of a network of small-scale ropeway, 
pulley and suspension bridges and (b) the establishment of collection centers, market 
stalls and wholesale markets with local initiative. The budget for these activities has 
decreased due to conflicts. The 10
th plan has a follow-on program. However, conflict has 
dramatically limited the scope for increased expenditure. Since the early 1990s, outward-
oriented reforms have led to the rise in the share of trade in the GDP. Nevertheless, the 
level of integration of Nepal with the world markets has been slow.  
Compared to the base year 1975, the food crop productivity index declined to 93 
in 1988. It recovered marginally to 125 by 2002. In contrast, the cash crops productivity 
increased steadily to 176 by 1988 and further to 326 by 2002 . During the 1990s, the 
import of food and live animals was around 9.4% of total imports, while their share in 




Table 13—Import tariff and bound tariff on major agricultural products       
(August 2002) (%) 
Products India  Pakistan  Bangladesh  Sri  Lanka  Nepal  Bhutan 







(90 products have 
200%; 10 %have 59%) 





Not entered into WTO 
Cereals 36 25  36  30  10  30 














35.2-40.4 25  36-86.4  30  25-40  30 
Coffee/tea 108  20-25  36  30 
(qr for tea) 
10-25 20 
Spices 35.2-76.8 
(qr for cc) 
20 26-102.3  6-60  5-10  20 
Animals 35.2  10-20.25  11  30  10  20 
Poultry 35.2  20-oct  26+qr  30  10  20 
Egg 35.2+qr  20  36+qr  30  10  10 
Meats and skin  0-35  0-25/oct  0-36  12-30  5-10  10-30 
Fish/crustaceans 35.2  10  36-62.5  12  10  20 
Dairy products  15-60  20-25  36-86.5  10-30  10-15  30 
Rice 87.2  10  26  60 10  20 
Wheat and wheat 
flour 
35.2-50 20-25  11-18.5  0-10  10  20 
Coarse grain and 
flours 
019.6-50 10-25  3.5-18.5  0-30  10  20 
Processed cereals  36-56/qr  20-25  36-75.8  5-30  10  20 
Spices 35.2-35.2/qr  20  36-75.8  30  5-10  20 
Edible oils  75-85  S  18.5-36  26-30  5-15  30 
Fibers 9.2-19.6  5-10  3.5-26  0  5-10  0 
Sugar 60+qr  25  86.4  3.5  40  20 
Rubber 30-76.8  5  18.5  12  5  20 
Raw tobacco  36  25  18.5  90  10  100 
Wool, and wood 
products 
5-36 10-25  3.5-36  0-30  5-15  10-30 
Source: WTO/Nepal Unit 2002. Q R: Quantitative restrictions, DG: Dried Grapes. BN: Betel nuts, CC: Cardamom. 
Box 2—Tariffs and taxes on food trade in Nepal 
1.  Import tariff- Nepal has the lowest tariffs in the SAARC region in almost all products. The average 
tariff on agricultural products is 14.5%. For processed or frozen products it ranges between 25-40%.  
2.  Local development tax (LDT) and security tax are levied on imports. The LDT was levied by removing 
the octroi levied earlier. The security tax is levied temporarily for maintaining law and order. 
3.  An export tax of 5% is levied on few commodities like soybean oil, ghee and vegetable oil. Most other 
countries in the region provide some export incentive. 
4.  Nepal does not have significant non-tariff barriers except a quarantine standard and product composition 
standards on inputs such as fertilizers. Nepal has been harmonizing as per the Codex Standards.  
5.  In WTO, Nepal has committed to an average tariff of 51%, to be lowered to an average of 42%after 3 
years.28 
Since the 1990s the Government aimed to deliver the benefits of liberalization to 
the poor. Public expenditure was increased in the priority rural sectors for poverty 
alleviation. The target was to enhance employment and income opportunities to the poor 
and the disadvantaged by emphasizing social security, physical infrastructure and human 
resources development. The scope of liberalization was extended to the agricultural 
sector where the following policies were adopted. 
•  Removing input and output subsidies in agriculture.  
•  Privatizing AIC and deregulating the price in agricultural inputs and products. 
Price determination was left to the market force. NFC too was to be privatized, 
and subsidies in food distribution were removed. 
•  Increasing private sector participation in the production, distribution and 
marketing.  
•  Reducing the tariff rates on food products, and to open agriculture to FDI. 
The government adopted the food security agenda in the Ninth Plan (1997-2002). 
In line with the Rome Declaration, the government decided to implement the 
mandates of achieving sustainable food security for eradicating poverty and 
improving access to food for all. 
As far as the impact of reforms and liberalization is concerned, the evidence from 
the aggregate level points to there being a reasonable improvement in incomes and 
standards of living. The difference is in the form of diverse impacts across regions in 
Nepal. The main question is why have reforms worked differently across regions? The 29 
current economic distribution reinforces the prior ordered economic status of the regions. 
To understand whether the liberalization per se has reinforced this pre existing ordering, 
we look to the evidence from the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models on 
Nepal that can be used to address this question.  
5.  RESULTS FROM THE CGE MODELS 
The impacts of trade liberalization on poverty in Nepal have been studied using 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models by Cockburn (2001) and Sapkota (2002). 
Both these studies use the same model, but differ in the base data used in the simulation. 
Cockburn’s study is based on the social accounting matrix (SAM) for the year 1986, 
while Sapkota’s study uses the SAM for 1996-97. Their findings, however, are quite 
similar qualitatively except for some small differences in the magnitude of the impacts.  
Since the results from these two studies are vital for the thesis in the paper, it is 
worthwhile to study the main features of these models. The models distinguish seven 
household categories based on location and occupational status as urban; small farm, 
large farm and non-farm Terai; small farm, large farm and non-farm Hills and Mountains. 
Firms, government and rest of the world are the other agents in the model. The model 
distinguishes five types of primary factors, viz., unskilled labor, skilled labor, land, 
agricultural and non-agricultural capital, which are further distinguished along the lines 
of household categories.  
The models consider sixteen commodity producing sectors, with the production 
desegregated by their location (Urban / Terai / Hills and Mountains). Production is 30 
modeled as a nested-CES structure. The model allows for factor mobility across sectors 
within each region but not across regions. Households receive income from factor 
payments and transfers from firms, government and the rest of world. Transfers from the 
government and the rest of world are assumed fixed. Consumption is modeled using a 
linear expenditure system. The model allows for imperfect substitutability of 
domestically produced goods and their imported counterparts and between exports and 
local sales for the domestically produced goods. The volume of investment, foreign 
savings, government consumption, world prices for exports and imports, all remain fixed 
in the model.  
The simulation involves elimination of all import tariffs with a compensatory 
uniform consumption tax designed to maintain government revenue constant. The main 
findings of these two studies are as follows:  
Trade liberalization brings about sectoral reallocation of resources away from 
some agriculture and industry (mining and manufacturing in particular) towards services 
sectors (hotel/restaurant, trade and transport/communication), which is reflected as a 
corresponding fall / rise in the output of these sectors. Output loss in the agricultural 
sectors is less than one percent. The losses / gains in output amongst the industrial and 
service sectors range much larger. Prices decline in all the sectors, with agriculture 
witnessing the maximum decline of about 4.0%– 4.3%. This has a direct bearing on the 
food security concerns of the agricultural producers. 
Most importantly, the changes in agricultural output are not uniform across 
regions. While paddy output declines in all regions, it is sharpest in the Hills and 31 
Mountains. Output of other food crops increases in Terai but declines in the Hills and 
Mountains. This pattern is reversed only in the case of cash crops, livestock/fisheries and 
forestry. Changes (increase / decline) in industrial and services output are more or less 
similar across regions.  
All factor prices decline in all the regions, commensurate with the fall in output in 
several sectors and fall in prices of all sectors. The maximum decline is witnessed in the 
case of agricultural capital and land (-4.4% to –5.4%), followed by unskilled labour (-
2.9% to –4.3%). Non-agricultural capital is the relative winner as the price decline is least 
for this factor (-0.6% to 01.7%).  
Decline in wages (both skilled and unskilled) is the least in urban areas, while the 
decline in returns to agricultural capital and land is least in the Hills and Mountains. 
While all household categories experience a decline in their incomes, the loss is least for 
urban households (-1.8%), while it is nearly double for the households in Terai and Hills 
and Mountains (-3.3%). This is because the households in these two regions derive most 
of their income primarily from land and unskilled labour, both of which witness large fall 
in their factor prices. Consumer prices fall most in agricultural sectors (-3.0% -3.4%) and 
in manufacturing (-3.7%) that were highly protected initially and / or import-intensive. 
As a result, consumer price index falls for all household types. However, there are no 
regional differences in the decline in consumer price index (-3.1%).  
The decline in income levels and consumer prices have opposite effects on 
household consumption. Equivalent variations in consumption reveal that trade 
liberalization has little impact on aggregate welfare but there are winners and losers. 32 
Welfare of urban households rise (0.47%) while the remaining households lose in both 
terai (-0.09%) and Hills and Mountains (-0.06%). This could be due to the pro-urban bias 
in income effects seen above.  
The impact of trade liberalization on poverty (head count ratio using a poverty 
line of “one-half of nationwide median income”, which is a relative measure), is a 
negligible decline (-0.01%) for the country as a whole. At a regional level, there is a 
decline in poverty in the urban (-0.07%) and Terai (-0.19%) regions but a rise in poverty 
in the Hills and Mountains (0.15%). The poverty gap measure (FGT index) evaluated for 
different poverty lines reveal a slight reduction in the depth of poverty in rural areas 
among the very poorest and a clear rise in poverty among the moderately poor, while the 
very wealthy households are the main beneficiaries of trade liberalization.  
Given this structure of the effects from liberalization where there are losers from 
liberalization, there is a basis for safety nets that the government needs to adopt. Nepal, 
has a long history of government intervention in food policy. The most important element 
of government intervention has been the Nepal Food Corporation, the procurement and 
distribution agency of the government.  
6.  FOOD SECURITY POLICIES AND THE PLACE OF NFC 
Box 1documents the origin and the functioning of the Nepal Food Corporation (NFC) as 
part of the evolution of food policy in Nepal. The basic principle behind the Nepal Food 
Corporation was a safety net to the vulnerable sections of the population. Food 
distribution in the remote hill and mountain districts is managed through NFC and 33 
District Disaster Management Committees. The big question is how well has the NFC 
met its desired objectives? 
Table 14—Food Distribution Quota and Sales in Different Areas (MT) 
 
Inaccessible districts  Accessible districts  Years/indicators 
Quota Sales  Quota  Sales 
1998/99 15,435  17,790  26,000  30,097 
1999/00 13,500  14,648  22,500  10,519 
2000/01 11,170  9,607  20,000  9,307 
2001/02 10,219  7,119  20,000  15,073 
Average 12,581  12,291  22,125  16,249 
Quota in total (%)  36.3    63.7   
Sales in total (%)    43.1    56.9 
Sales against quota (%)    97.7    73.4 
Source: NFC 2002, Planning Division, Central Office. 
During 1996–2001, the sales of NFC have declined by almost 50% but the share 
of sales in remote areas has been increasing. Wallace (1987) argued that food prices were 
lower in Kathmandu valley (with richer population) than elsewhere. In Kathmandu 
valley, the NFC met 15.5% of demand in 1997 (Adhikari and Bohle, 1999a) and 9% in 
2002 (Pandey, 2002).  
NFC's distribution to remote areas has not been targeted effectively at needy 
households despite a heavy financial burden on the government. Data for the 1998-2002 
indicates that NFC apportioned only 36% of its target quota for the inaccessible regions 
as against 64% for the accessible regions (Table 14 and figure 5). The leakages and the 
inefficiency in the system are seen from the following evidences:  
Since the 1975 famine, the government started sending food to the Karnali region 
by air, a region that receives about 40-50% of the subsidized food. A big part of this 
subsidy accrues to the airlines. The air transport costs in the range Rs 40-60 per kg of 34 
rice. In contrast road transport via Tibet would cost only Rs 20 per kg. Using more labor-
intensive means will also generate employment yielding double dividends. In 1988, 
Jumla received 800 MT of rice. Of the 800 MT, about 615 MT was airlifted in 474 
charter flights and rest 185 MT was transported by mules and porters. Transportation of 
185 MT to Jumla requires about 27,550 man-days, i.e. 6 man-days for every 40 kg. If the 
remaining 615 MT were also transported by porters, it would have generated over 92,000 
man-days (353 man-year) of employment. To put things in perspective, Figure 6 shows 
the composition of the subsidies (interest and transport). The transport subsidy clearly 
dominates the interest subsidy.  
In 1998, 60% of allocation in Karnali was for government employees and 
teachers. NFC’s distribution in most food deficit and moderately food deficit areas (38 
districts) mitigated less than 4% of the deficit in 1994 (ANZDEC 2002). Much of the 
distribution of the NFC is directed towards the richer Kathmandu valley as figure 5 
shows (Years with * relate to distribution of only rice). 35 







































































Moreover, a recent study reveals that compared to other SAARC countries, food 
programs in Nepal are much less cost-effective, mainly on account of more expensive 
internal transport, storage and handling costs. Part of the higher costs is however 
attributable to more difficult geography (ANZDEC 2002). 36 
 Accumulated losses of the NFC were a whopping NRs. 884 million until 1990 
and NRs. 905 million by 1996 (APROSC 1998). Perry (2000) estimated that NFC 
requires US $ 7-1,176 per MT depending upon the district as internal transport and 
handling cost (ITHC). The present study estimates the average ITHC at Rs 27 per kg. The 
cost of transporting rice is Rs 49.0 per kg. Based on different indicators, NFC does not 
seem to be well geared in meeting the food security objectives in a cost effective manner. 
Different reforms have been attempted to better the functioning of the NFC. The next 
section discusses these reforms and to what extent have they transformed the 
organization. 
 7.  REFORMS IN NFC 
  One of the most important elements of liberalization has been the restructuring of 
the NFC. We discuss below the main reforms in the NFC.  
7.1  CLOSURE OF SALES DEPOTS 
As part of the restructuring, NFC withdrew sales depots from 29 districts, and 
reduced number of depots from 135 to 67, with effect from 1
st Jan 2000. Branch offices 
were also reduced from 26 to 19. Most of the 68 abandoned depots are located in 
accessible areas. It has been proposed that Maoist affected areas should get privileges. 
The actual implementation of this proposal seems questionable as 2 depots in Maoist 
inflicted Jajarkot district have also been closed. The depots where accessibility through 
roads has not improved like Jumla, Humla, Mugu have also been withdrawn. The 37 
government suggested keeping 31 depots in 12 districts as remote depots and another 31 
depots in 12 districts as semi-remote depots. As part of downsizing, NFC terminated 305 
temporary employees and accepted the resignation from 125 staffs on the basis of 
voluntary retirement scheme. The current staff strength is 772. Further downsizing seems 
less likely due to pressures from the employees union.  
7.2 FOOD  PROCUREMENT 
Prior to liberalization, NFC procured food periodically from local markets or 
directly from farmers at a price equal to or above the minimum support price (MSP) in 
the food surplus areas. Paddy procurement was concentrated in areas having rice-
processing plants (Rajapur and Bardiya district). Rice was procured from the private rice 
mills or trading houses. The share of paddy in total procurement ranged between 2-5% ( 
Panday, 2002). Following liberalization, the government discontinued the MSP, so the 
NFC procured rice from the open market. The procurement system of paddy remains the 
same as before. NFC's major sources of procurement are generally within the country, 
except in 1994/95 when it procured 35 thousand MT from India as compared to 14 
thousand MT from the domestic market. The amount of direct purchase from the farmers 
varied at different times (Table 15). Figure 7 shows the trends in procurement price. The 
NFC's procurements seem related with the discontinuation of the policy of MSP. The 
greater reliance on open market operations has led to the decline in food procurements by 
NFC and consequent declines in the stocks and go down capacity utilizations (Figure 8). 
  38 
Table 15—Procurement by NFC 1990-2002 (Unit: MT) 
 
Rice market  Wheat market  Fiscal year 
Internal External  Internal External 
1990/91 15,602    17   
1991/92 30,311  25,000  3,567  28,610 
1992/93 23,475    2,306   
1993/94 25,512  22,336  1,375   
1994/95 13,800  34,809  1,080   
1995/96 20,659  16,908  1,151   
1996/97  17,912 5,754  12,496  
1997/98 1,715       
1998/99 19,442  14,517     
1999/2000 22,789  5,975     
2000/01 2,138       
2001/02 9,629  8,858    
Total purchase = sum of Rice, Wheat and Maize.  
Source: NFC, Planning Division, Central Office. 
 



































































































8.  EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (NFC): 
PRE AND POST LIBERALIZATION 
8.1  HUMAN RESOURCES HANDLING EFFICIENCY 
In order to assess the efficiency of the NFC, we estimate the average market-
handling ratio for the total volume as well as the internal purchases. Total market 
handling peaked to 132 MT per staff in 1982/83. But by 1997/98, the efficiency ratio 
came down to 20 MT due to an increase in the number of permanent staffs and the lower 
quantity of handling (Figure 9). The performance for the domestic procurement was even 
lower. The efficiency declined from 74 MT to 10 MT during 1991-2001.  
 40 


























































































8.2 TRANSPORTATION  EFFICIENCY 
Public intervention in mountain districts involves very high transportation cost as food is 
being transported by air. Trucks and porters are used in few areas with road networks. The 
transport subsidy per MT has increased every year except in the last 3 years, and is directly 
linked with the amount supplied. Transportation by land is considerably cheaper. The air 
transport cost ranges from Rs 32,432- 45,611 per MT, whereas the surface mode costs only 
between Rs. 9,341-14,280 per MT (Table 16). Recently ground movement of grains has 
become more improbable because of the insurgency in mountain areas. 
Table 16—Public Transportation Cost by Mode of Transportation                     
(Unit: MT Rs. '000') 
Total By  air  By  surface  Fiscal 















1996/97  15,114 226,819 15.0  3,655  119,780 32.8  11,459 107,039 9.3 
1997/98  14,000 267,350 19.1  4,113  157,658 38.3  9,887  109,691 11.1 
1998/99  16,367 334,596 20.4  4,278  195,122 45.6  12,089 139,474 11.5 
1999/00  14,218 332,804 23.4  6,661  239,967 36.0  7,551  92,837  12.3 
2000/01  9,773 232,118  23.8  5,187 176,060  33.9  4,584 56,058 12.2 
2001/02  6,792 200,000  29.4  4,255 165,200  38.8  2,437 34,800 14.3 
Source: NFC, Planning Division, Central Office. 41 
9.  COMPARISON OF EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR WITH 
THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
To put these changes in a perspective, this section compares the effectiveness of 
the private sector to that of NFC. The private sector has expanded over the last decade 
but it is still comparatively small. The main reason for the minimal role of the private 
sector is the lack of physical and marketing infrastructure that determines the access to 
the markets.  
In the absence of a systematic survey of agro-product markets, it is difficult to 
determine the market potential for the private sector (Vaidya, 1997). With the 
development of roads, the private sector has been gradually replacing the public sector in 
food marketing. Still, the private sector involvement in the inaccessible food deficit areas 
is negligible except in some tourist trekking routes. Generally, private sector involvement 
in food supply is up to a six km radius from the road head. A survey with the traders 
revealed the following reasons for their lack of involvement: (i) absence of appropriate 
storage facilities in remote areas, (ii) Proportionally higher credit sales in these areas, (iii) 
low purchasing power of the consumer and the preference for barter trade. 
Even though the reach of the private sector is limited, it is worthwhile to compare 
its efficiency with the public sector because for the latter, it serves as an immediate 
benchmark. Below, we compare the private and the public sector based on several 
indicators. The time of comparison is current unless otherwise stated. 42 
9.1 SELLING  PRICES 
The NFC price of food is below the local market price. In Jumla, for example, the 
market price of coarse rice is Rs. 50/Kg. while NFC price is Rs. 24/kg. If the cost of air 
transportation were added to the price, the effective price increases many-folds. In 
addition, the government has to make provision for go-downs in the food deficit districts. 
This further adds to the overhead costs relative to the private sector. 
9.2 HANDLING  CHARGES 
The handling charges for the NFC are also much higher, all of which however are 
not related to inefficiency (Table 17). NFC for example adheres to minimum quality 
standards as per the Food Grain Quality Act 1966 (in terms of moisture content, foreign 
materials, organic matter etc).  The quality of the private sector in contrast is poor and un-
monitored. The transportation costs are also higher for the public sector due to a 10% 
value added tax. The private sector is free to hire vehicles without any bid bond 
requirement. Also, the standard truckload for the public sector is lower owing to 
regulations. The public sector storage facilities are costly and meet higher standards. It is 
extremely difficult to filter out the inefficiency component from the data. 
9.3 MARKETING  COSTS 
There is little information regarding the marketing cost of the private sector. What 
is important is the marketing cost as a fraction of the prevailing sales prices of the NFC 43 
(Table 17). The results show that in the Kathmandu Valley, the NFC incurs a loss of 52% 
of the consumer price. Losses are expected to be higher in remote areas. 
Table 17—Marketing Cost of coarse Rice in Kathmandu by Agencies (1982) 
 
Operations  NFC (rs./mt)  Private sector (rs/mt) 
Sales price  3,651  5,017 
Farmer's share  3,706  3,464 
Marketing cost  1,614  951 
Transport cost  293  522 
Physical losses  115  71 
Milling cost  72  67 
Packaging 101  24 
Handling 580  71 
Storage 433  188 
Taxes 20  8 
Profit margin  (-1,669)  602 
Wholesaler 161  251 
Miller 13  201 
Retailer 55  150 
Institution (nfc)  (-1,898)  - 
Source: Estimates are based on Munakarmi, 1985. 
9.4 LOSSES/LEAKAGES 
The losses of NFC are largely attributable to its high marketing costs that are in 
turn high because of handling costs (36% of marketing cost or 16% of consumer price). 
On the revenue side, the NFC prices are lower than the open market prices. HMG 
Treasury bears a part of the losses relating to transport costs. The residual is reflected in 
the balance sheet, and accumulates year after year. HMG contribution to the NFC shows 
the subsidy as a direct cost to the government. While estimating total cost, the NFC 
losses should also be included, especially since the losses are high in relation to the 
volume of grain handled. Higher administrative costs, interest charges on past-
accumulated losses, and a lower sales price resulted in heavy losses to the NFC. Overall, 44 
the private sector's efficiency is 40% higher since the private sector's procurement price is 
6.53% lower and the marketing costs are 41% lower (Table 18).  
Table 18—Marketing Costs and Margins of Private and Public Sector in Accessible 
Areas 
I.  Marketing cost (% share of each category below)  Private  Public 
1. Transport  11.6  18.2 
2. Storage  4.0  26.8 
3. Packing  0.6  6.3 
4. Processing  1.4  4.5 
5. Physical  loss  1.4  7.1 
6. Dealers  margin  12.2  35.9 
A) Assembler    7.1 
B) Wholesaler/Miller  2.0   
C) Retailer    3.1 
II. Total  Marketing  Cost  31.2  44.2 
III.   Consumer Price  100  100 
NFC loss to consumer prices at national level    (-52.0) 
Source: Author's estimation based on the discussion with wholesaler of Rice at Kuleshower and Miller at Dilli Bazar, 
2002. NFC’s cost is estimated from profit and loss account. 
  
The overall conclusion is that the private sector has only assumed a limited role 
and in spite of the liberalization, the public sector continues to be highly inefficient in 
terms of a host of indicators. The benefits of liberalization has not accrued either in the 
form of a more efficient public sector or an expansion of the role of the private sector.  
Food import capacity (FIC) i.e. the ratio of food imports to total non-food exports, 
measures the capacity of a country to maintain sufficient foreign exchange to finance 
food imports. Table 19 shows that a large part of Nepal’s FIC is already used.  
Table 19—Food Import Capacity Index 







Sri lanka  0.14 
Simple average  0.32 
   Source: Wilson (2001). 45 
Most of the imports are sourced from India that are risky due to unreliable and 
insecure transport. The transportation cost thus includes the insurance premium. 
Payments are made directly to Indian suppliers. In case of imports from overseas, the 
payment is made through a Letter of Credit. The quality of imports does not seem to be a 
problem. The concerns expressed by the consumers occur at the retail level. 
9.5  COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN FOOD IMPORTS 
The import of agricultural commodities has been costly due different taxes such as 
agricultural development fee of 1%, local development tax equal to 1.5%, export duty of 
0.5% in India plus transportation costs. The estimated mark-up from the importers to the 
retailers is around 15%. The imports from India are the cheapest. The CIF price for rice 
imported by the private sector was Rs. 12,800/MT and Rs. 18,200/MT from India and 
overseas, respectively, in year 2001 (Table 20 and 21). The CIF price for sugar imported 
by the private sector is Rs. 16,800/MT and Rs. 21,200/MT from India and overseas, 
respectively. The price of sugar imported from India by the Salt Trading Corporation Ltd. 
(STCL) was Rs. 28,341/MT as against Rs. 16,800/MT by the private sector. Even in the 
case of imports, the cost of imports from India by the private sector is lower due to 
marketing and distribution efficiency. 46 
Table 20—Commodity Import Prices from India and Overseas Countries by 
Agencies  
Items/agency  Unit  Imports from India by 
private sector 
Private imports from 
overseas 
Public imports from 
India 
Rice (nfc)  Rs/mt  12,800  18,200  15,104 
Sugar (stcl)  Rs/mt  16,800  21,200  28, 341 
Note: Prices for rice imported by NFC are average for three points: Bhairahawa Rs. 14,878/M, Nepalgunj  
          Rs. 14,964/MT and Biratnagar Rs. 15,470/MT.Source: Rungta Trading Co, NFC and STCL.  
 
 
Table 21—Costing of Sugar Imported by STCL from India 
Particulars  Units/rates Amount  (Rs/mt.) 
Ex-border price in IRs.  Indian Rs  12,000.0 
Exchange rate of  NRs. With IRs.  1.60  19,218.0 
Custom duty (25%)  @ 25.0%  4,804.5 
Local dev tax and special duty on sr. no. 2  @ldt 1.5% sd 3.0%  864.8 
Sub-total   24,887.3 
Miscellaneous expenses    400.0 
Approx cost up to Nepal border    25,287.3 
Internal transportation    250.0 
Overhead expenses on sr.no.2  @ 1.0%  - 
Draft expenses  @ 0.1%  19.2 
Interest for 1 month on sr.no.2  @ 13%  208.2 
Sub-total   25,764.2 
Vat @  10.0%  2,576.5 
Cost at Birgunj go down    28,341.2 
Price per kilogram    28.3 
Source: Rungta Trading Co, NFC and STCL. 
10.  IMPACT OF LIBERALIZATION ON AGRICULTURE, TRADE AND 
LIVING STANDARDS  
The impact of liberalization on agriculture has been mixed in terms of 
productivity and income growth. Sharma (1994) concludes that liberalization made 
positive impacts on agriculture but finds no evidence of a reduction in indirect 
discrimination against agriculture. In contrast, Chapagain (2000) reported that 
liberalization did not bring any favorable impact in agriculture. Upadhaya (2000) and 
ANZDEC (2002) indicated that access to fertilizer market and its availability has 
improved over the years even though their actual consumption has declined.  47 
The per capita growth rate in agriculture increased from (–) 0.5% during the first 
part of the 1990s to 0.7% in the second part. The agricultural productivity also improved 
during these periods (ANZEDC 2002). As a result, the country had a food surplus in 
2001. But, food production again experienced a negative growth in 2002 owing to 
unfavorable climatic conditions and the upsurge in insurgency.  
One of the main reasons for increase in productivity of late has been the increased 
use of fertilizers. The private sector has become more involved in the fertilizer sector. 
The recent decline in the sales of fertilizers from 47 to 24 thousand MT during 1998-
2001 (Table 22) is attributable to the unrecorded/illegal import of fertilizers from India 
and not to a decline in the usage. The amount of such import is estimated to be 20%. 
Table 22—Import and Consumption of Fertilizers in Nepal by Type (MT) 
 
Nitrogen Phosphorus  (p2o5) Potash  Total  Year 
Import Use  Import  Use  Import Use  Import Use 
1997/98 51,429  32,629 5,222  13,124  -  1,442 56,651  47,195 
1998/99 28,440  32,314 17,800  12,097 -  1,258  46,240 45,669 
1999/00 13,800  25,034 -  12,031  -  185  13,800  37,250 
2000/01  - 16,397  -  7,191  - 35  - 23,623 
Source: CBS:  2002.  
Agricultural trade increased from an average of 9.1% of agricultural GDP in the 
first part of the 1990s to 13% in the second part. Nepal's agricultural trade balance with 
India changed from a deficit of NRs. 1,849 millions in the year 1995 to a surplus of NRs. 
180 million in 2000.  This is possibly due to APP’s emphasis on the high-value products 
and the non-reciprocal market access through the India-Nepal Trade Treaty of 1996.  
The import of food grains from India has increased since the price of rice in India 
is on an average 12% lower (mainly due to subsidies on fertilizers and electricity for 48 
irrigation). Nepal imported about 236 thousand MT of rice at an average price of NRs. 
11.1 per kg in the year 1999. Nepal's production of rice in the same year was 2.43 million 
MT. ANZDEC (2002) estimated that about 10% of rice consumed was imported from 
India. Import from India has been instrumental in contributing towards food security in 
Nepal. About 60% of the landless households have benefited from cheaper rice but at the 
same time this has been a distress for the net producers. Thus, about 40% households in 
Terai, who are net sellers of rice, have been adversely affected by trade with India.  
  According to the Institute of Integrated Development Studies (IIDS) study (1996), 
only marginal improvements have been noticed in wages and employment since 
liberalization (Table 23). According to the study, this happened due to an expansion in 
industries and service sectors. The study does not isolate the effects from liberalization. It 
is thus unclear, to what extent has liberalization contributed to this expansion.  
 
Table 23—Changes in Wage Rate Structure (1984-85 = 100) 
1989-90 1994-95  Labor category 
Current Real  Current Real 
Highly skilled  931.8  524.7  1515.0  508.9 
Skilled 752.8  423.9  1313.0  441.1 
Semi-skilled 655.6  369.6  1178.5  395.9 
Unskilled 546.2  307.6  1036.0  348.0 
Carpet (price (wage) rate per sq mt)         
Highly skilled  300.0  169.0  400.0  133.9 
Skilled 275.0  154.9  375.0  125.5 
Semi-skilled 250.0  140.8  350.0  117.2 
   Source: IIDS (1996). 
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The sources of income for the farmers have also undergone a change since 
1997/98. According to ANZDEC (2002) during 1997 - 2001, the household income from 
own farming went down from 77 to 72% whereas the contribution of non-farm sources 
increased from 11 to 14.5%.  
  The populace increasingly perceives an improvement in livelihood. In the 
ANZDEC study, a high proportion of wealthier households feel that they are better off 
now than in the last 4 years. Importantly, more than half of the poorer households also 
feel the same. More than 50% of the respondents agreed that their income had increased 
in last 4 years. ANZDEC estimated that household's income per capita increased by 
1.98% per year in the last 4 years of 1990s, which is close to the APP's estimate of 2%.  
It is difficult to relate the increase in income to liberalization per se. The income 
and the employment opportunities have also improved by labor migration especially to 
gulf countries that has contributed to higher incomes through remittances. Various studies 
show that about half of the households in villages have at least one migrant in the family. 
The 2001 Census shows that about 762,000 Nepalese have migrated to other countries for 
work. Many other migrants are undocumented as they have gone through illegal 
channels.  
Access to common resources through community forestry, the supply of farm 
yard manure to agriculture fields and also various non-timber forest products are other 
possible reasons for improving the livelihood opportunities for rural people. The role of 
community forestry especially in the 1990s in improving livelihood (food security by 
way of generating income and food resources) cannot be underestimated. There are more 50 
than 10,000 forest user groups in Nepal. These forest users have also generated funds that 
have been used for investment in social infrastructure and in providing loans to low-
income people. Many user groups have also developed enterprises for generating income.  
11.  IMPACT OF TARGETED FOOD SECURITY 
The food distribution system based on political demands, the infrequent allocation 
of emergency relief funds and the channeling of subsidized food to local pressure groups 
resulted in big failures for the government in ensuring food security. As the realization of 
this failure dawned on policy makers, there was a certain shift towards targeted programs. 
The following targeted measures dot the policy landscape in Nepal. 
(1). Food-for-works programs such as Rural Community Infrastructural Work 
(RCIW) generate seasonal employment to villagers by developing sustainable 
infrastructure. This is an entirely community driven program. The choice of the 
project is made by the communities, particularly women. At present, the program 
is under implementation in 25 districts. About 30,000 households from resource-
poor and disadvantaged deprived community participate in the program every 
year. The families are paid food rations and some cash. About 10,000 MT of food 
per annum is provided under this program (Perry 2000). Imparting literacy and 
other social activities are also carried out in order to empower people and improve 
the management of infrastructures. The RCIW program has also led to long-term 
food security through road construction, prevention from river cutting and 
protection of land.   51 
(2).  Primary school feeding program is implemented in conjunction with the 
Government's Basic and Primary School Program in food deficit areas. These 
areas are also low literacy areas particularly for women. The program is run with 
the help of WFP. The basic aims of the program are to encourage the enrolment, 
reduce drop-outs and repeaters, stimulate regular attendance, relieve short-term 
hunger and increase learning ability in 12 districts. The program provides a 
regular mid-day meal to students.  
(3).  Relief and emergency operations provide food to the victims of calamities 
(including the basic and supplementary rations to refugees). The schemes provide 
assistance during disasters like drought, flood and landslides. Along with the 
government, the following UN agencies are also involved: UNICEF, WFP, FAO 
and WHO. 
The broad message from the targeted food security programs is that they have 
been better at containing leakages. They are also community driven thereby raising the 
level of accountability. In relation to these programs, the NFC needs major 
improvements. The NFC uses the accessibility criteria for targeting. The accessible areas 
by roads do not qualify for transport subsidy. Targeting should instead use more 
comprehensive criteria such as road density, incidence of poverty, and vulnerability to 
disaster area. There could be a premium in downsizing public distribution system and 
involving private sector there. Comparing the effectiveness of the food distribution 
programs as a safety net to the targeted poverty reduction programs for food security is 
an important area of further research.   52 
12. NEW  AND  EMERGING  TRADE ARRANGEMENTS 
On the external front, at least two important changes are either imminent or relatively 
new for Nepal viz: (i) regional integration and (ii) membership of the WTO. We look at 
the prospects from these in this section.   
Some parts of Nepal are more closely integrated with India than with other 
regions of Nepal. Nepal lacks surplus rice for exports but it sells to Indian traders during 
the pre-harvesting season at a cheaper rate compared to other regions of Nepal. Similarly, 
apples produced in Marfa and oranges produced in Pokhara also reach the Indian market 
and return in the off-seasons due to lack of domestic cold storage facility.  
The major exports to India are the agricultural products such as mustard and 
linseeds, herbs, ghee, dried ginger, pulses, oilcake, catechu, rice bran oil and jute goods, 
and those to other countries are carpets, readymade garments, handicrafts, pulses, hides 
and skin, Nepalese paper, paper products, and medicinal herbs. There are opportunities 
for value-addition through agro-processing and packaging to increase the competitiveness 
of products in international markets for various commodities. The 10th plan stressed the 
development of marketing facilities in the hilly areas for livestock, horticulture and 
specific crops to raise the outreach in these areas. The Agriculture Enterprise Center 
(AEC) has provided assistance to commercialize tea, dairy, vegetable seeds etc and 
improve farm productivity and expand markets for the benefit of farmers and agro-
entrepreneurs. 53 
  About one third of Nepal’s trade is intra-regional. India’s share in Nepal’s exports 
and imports is nearly 50% and 25% respectively (Table 24 and 25). Thus, the benefit 
from regional integration will depend heavily on India's trade policy towards Nepal. 
There were extremely good returns to Nepal when India offered very favorable terms in 
the 1996 Indo Nepal treaty. 
Table 24—Intra-regional Trade Composition of Nepal with SAARC Countries 
(1998)  
Items  Total intra  
regional trade 
India Pakistan Bangladesh Sri  lanka Maldives Bhutan 
Export (mn $)  160.8  145.5  0.8  9.6  4.9  0.0  Na 
Percentage 100  90.5  0.5  6.0  3.0  0.0  Na 
Import (mn $)  454.0  439.7  6.2  5.9  2.2  0.0  Na 
Percentage 100  96.9  1.4  1.3  0.5  0.0  Na 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 2000. 
 
Table 25—Intra-Regional Trades as Percentage of Total Trade (1998) 
 
Intra-regional import  Intra-regional export  Total intra-regional trade  Countries 
1990 1998 1990 1998 1990  1998 
India  0.4 1.1 2.7 5.6 1.4  3.2 
Pakistan  1.6 2.4 4.0 4.9 2.7  3.6 
Bangladesh 7.0  17.5  3.1  2.7  5.8  12.4 
Sri lanka  7.0  12.9  3.7  2.4  5.6  8.2 
Nepal 13.4 31.7 7.7  36.2 11.9  32.8 
Maldives  7.4 7.7 13.8  16.6  9.2  9.4 
Bhutan  10.9 59.9 9.6  81.9 9.7  71.8 
South  asia  2.0 4.3 3.1 7.5 2.4  4.9 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 2000. 
 
India-Nepal Trade treaty allows free access of primary products on a reciprocal 
basis, and preferential access of manufactures on non-reciprocal basis. In 2000, Nepal's 
agricultural exports to India were almost 87% of the total agricultural exports and imports 
were about 48% of the total agricultural imports. In 2002, the renewal of bilateral trade 
has created some problems when India decided to fix value-addition at 25% in the first 54 
year with the provision for increasing it to 30% for subsequent years, and the imposition 
of tariff rate quotas. Quantitative restrictions have also been imposed on some items.  
The SAPTA/SAFTA aims to open the regional market by harmonizing tariffs 
among countries. Among SAARC countries, tariff preference ranges between 5-50%, 
with higher concessions for LDCs like Nepal. The main features of the treaty are: (i) 
elimination of tariffs (ii) removal of structural impediments to trade, (iii) harmonization 
of custom procedures, (iv) enhancing trade facilitation and (v) ensuring equitable benefit 
to all members.  
13.  IMPLICATIONS OF WTO MEMBERSHIP FOR 
COMPETITIVENESS/FOOD SECURITY  
Nepal applied for full membership in the WTO in 1989 after an 18 month long trade 
dispute with India. The dispute encouraged policy makers to hedge against risks by 
opening up to multiple partners. The Working Party on the accession of Nepal was 
established in June 1999 and held its first meeting in May 2000. The Working Party 
completed its work in August 2003, leaving the final approval for the Ministerial in 
September 2003.  
After Cambodia, WTO ministers approved Nepal's membership in September 
2003 and Nepal became the 147th member and the first least-developed country (along 
with Cambodia) to join the WTO through the full working party negotiation process. The 
5th Ministerial Conference at Cancun in Mexico approved the accession package on 
September 11, 2003. Subsequently on March 24, 2004 Nepal had solicited to the WTO 
that the process of ratification and acceptance of Protocol of Accession had been 55 
completed by Royal Ordinance since there was no Parliament in Session. The entry into 
force of the Protocol occurred 30 days later on April 23, 2004. 
Nepal is not yet prepared to compete with other developing countries mainly 
because of her inexperience in trade facilitation. Nepal seems likely to need preferential 
access to key industrialized markets on the basis of special and differential treatment and 
longer time frames to implement the WTO Agreements. There is a need to address all 
three pillars-export subsidy, market access and domestic support by making Special & 
Differential treatment an integral part of all the negotiations on agriculture.  
In light of the accession, few considerations apply. The APP strategy to 
commercialize agriculture and develop market links is important because Nepal's farm 
productivity is lowest in South Asia. The productivity in developed countries is 10-15 
times higher for milk and almost 3 times for meat. Therefore, there is a big scope to 
increase productivity through increased inputs and better management.  
  The reforms of the 1990s reduced both taxes and subsidies. Direct subsidies have 
mostly been removed while taxes in Nepal are lowest in the SAARC region. Nepal does 
not provide domestic subsidy; domestic support to the farm sector has been declining, 
support to agricultural research and extension is about 2.8% of the agricultural output and 
falls within the de minimis limit of 10% allowed by AoA. 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) has three main 
components: (a) reduction in farm export subsidies (b) cut in domestic producer subsidies 
and (c) an increase in market access. Nepal is net importer of food. It is feared that the 
food bill of the net food importing countries will rise if the subsidies by the exporting 56 
countries get reduced. The Doha declaration made provisions for: (a) food aid and 
provision to increase amounts under grants, (b) full consideration of requests for financial 
and technical assistance to improve agricultural infrastructure and productivity, (c) 
appropriate provision for export credit and (d) short-term assistance in financing imports 
from international financial institutions. LDCs like Nepal need to take a more proactive 
approach in the negotiations to ensure implementation of the declaration. The AoA is 
likely to affect Nepalese agriculture in the following ways.  
1.  Under the rules for market access, Nepal has committed to tariffication of all non-
tariff barriers. The framework in the WTO negotiations is to lower bound tariffs 
rates. The bound tariff rates in Nepal are higher than the applied. This offers 
scope for adjustment in tariffs in order to protect farmers if the need so arises. 
2.  In the AoA, agriculture production support up to 10% of output is exempt; tariff 
and export subsidy by the least developed countries are allowed. Nepal has 
negotiated to provide assistance to agricultural producers through research and 
extension services, natural disaster relief through crop subsidies, loans and grants 
for irrigation, infrastructure support to small farmers and urea transport subsidies 
for remote areas.  
3.  The "green box" support includes government-services to research, disease 
control, infrastructure, irrigation, food security, direct income transfers to farmers, 
farmers’ assistance to restructure agriculture, direct payments under 
environmental programs, and government assistance to encourage agriculture 
production up to 10% of the total output.  57 
4.  WTO membership has opened up avenues for private sector to be competitive and 
capture the opportunities arising from non-discriminatory, transparent and 
predictable market access in the WTO Member countries. 
5.  Bilateral agreements of which Nepal is a part are allowed if they are non-
discriminating. 
6.  WTO arrangements do not pose any tight constraint in the LDCs on providing 
subsidies to farmers for producing staple foods. Developed and developing 
countries are required to cut tariffs and subsidies in a scheduled manner. The 
deadline for Nepal to bring down agricultural tariff (from 51 to 42%) is December 
31, 2006. 
7.  The SPS measures are pivotal for exports as the importing country are allowed to 
impose standards unilaterally as long as they adhere to certain restrictions like 
being minimum trade distorting among the possible choices or if they are based 
on ensuring internationally followed standards such as Codex. HMG/N Ministry 
of Finance has asked the EU for technical assistance on human resource 
development, capacity and institution building. This will help to minimize the 
cost of compliance.  
Also, Nepal does not provide minimum support prices like India. The accession 
would not deter subsidy on distribution in food deficit areas. The support to the staple 
production is allowed. Transport subsidy on food and fertilizers in remote hills (poor 
regions) is also exempt. In summary, accession would not affect food security initiatives 
of the government. As a net-food importer, Nepal can also receive special considerations 58 
under the Doha Declaration such as: (i) provision for food aid (ii) consideration of 
request for financial and technical assistance, (iii) differential terms with respect to export 
credits, and (iv)short-term assistance from international institutions in financing imports. 
The imported agricultural input-costs in production ranged from about 2 to 15 % 
in Nepal during the Ninth Plan period (1997-2002). The WTO membership is unlikely to 
affect the cost of farm production. The agricultural inputs are already purchased in the 
open markets. Nepal is a small buyer there will be no effect on world price because of the 
entry into the WTO. Development of irrigation schemes falls under land improvement, 
which is exempt. If the government wants to reintroduce the subsidy in Shallow Tube 
Well (STW), it can be covered under both infrastructure development and special 
assistance to the poor farmers. Interest subsidy as support to the poor farmers is also 
exempt.  
14. CONCLUSION 
In assessing the impact of liberalization on food security in Nepal, it seems 
correct to recognize that liberalization did have positive impacts. This shows up in the 
improvement in several aggregate indicators like per capita food availability and extent of 
malnourishment. The overall impact however has been limited, the reasons for which are 
two fold. First, Nepal shares a long porous border with India. Thus, restrictive trade 
policies have only a limited bite. Secondly, the regions in Nepal are segregated from each 
other. The remote areas in the hills and the mountains have not benefited from 
liberalization while the terai has reaped most of the benefits. 59 
The stagnant productivity has meant that Nepal has been uncompetitive in 
agricultural products. Starting from a national surplus, Nepal has become a net food 
importer over time. In that scenario, cheaper food imports through liberalization or 
movement through porous border with India has been critical for lower food prices. The 
cheaper rice price however has been transmitted only imperfectly as prices in remote 
areas are much higher compared to terai.  
The domestic reforms in Nepal have been mostly in the form of the restructuring 
of the Nepal Food Corporation. There has been an active downsizing of the NFC with a 
closure of depots and reduction in personnel. The outcome of the reform has however 
been not encouraging. The NFC continues to be mis-targeted and comparatively 
inefficient relative to the private sector. 
The policy suggestions for Nepal can be clubbed into two categories. The short to 
medium run policy should be directed towards greater involvement of the private sector 
in handling/storage and marketing. The need is to create incentives for greater private 
sector participation. This could take the form of sharing transportation and storage 
facilities. Given the adverse geography of the country, the biggest element of subsidy for 
the government has been on transporting grains. The government has relied excessively 
on air transport for shipping grains. Shifting to ground transportation will not only reduce 
costs but also create employment. This, by itself will contribute to food security. 
Ultimately in the long run, the government has to take steps for the greater spatial 
integration of the markets. It has to create marketing and physical infrastructure. 
Proposals for creating a pulley link between different regions have been in the discussion 60 
but have not been implemented. The contrast of Nepal with the experience of Bangladesh 
is quite stark here. Bangladesh invested in the integration of markets through roadways 
and to an extent through waterways. As a result, the benefits of liberalization there have 
been much more even than in Nepal. 
In the policies discussed above, the current insurgency and political uncertainty 
stands as a roadblock. Not only has it affected the atmosphere for private enterprise 
adversely, implementation of government programs and feasibility of certain policies 
themselves have been put to question (like transporting grains using ground). At the same 
time, the extremely scarce government resources have been diverted to military purposes.   
The trading arrangement changes in the form of regional integration and 
membership of WTO are likely to offer good opportunities for Nepal. The impact of 
these changes will depend a lot on the creation of the infrastructure in the form of trade 
facilitation measures. In the regional context the gains depend heavily on the trading 
arrangement with India. 61 
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